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Books under review in this essay:
The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citrzens, by Seyla Benhabib, Cambridge, UK
and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xii, 251 pp. $23,99 paperback; $65.00
hardcover.
According to the principle of state sovereignty, the rulers govern. In democratic theory
focused on the state, the key issue is how those who govern are chosen and, once chosen, the
rules according to which they govern. According to the principle of popular sovereignty,
the people govern; they are the authors as well as the subjects of law The key issue is
choosing who constitutes the people. Who is to be admitted into membership and how must
they conduct themselves once admitted? In democratic theory focused on the people, the
key issues are how members are chosen, how they are included to be part of the "people"
who govern within a boundaried territory and in an economically, socially, politically, and
militarily interdependent world of very diverse peoples.
A community must decide who to admit into membership. Further, what are the terms
of membership once admitted? Benhabib focuses on both issues as key ingredients of
democratic theory based on the principle of self-determination, for "democratic gover-
nance implies drawing boundaries and creating rules of membership" (174) However, the
cosmopolitan content of rights, such as Article 3 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECH R) stating that "no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment," is an absolute norm. In contrast, the Refugee Convention allows
exceptions for those deemed security threats. Article 3 of the European Commission on
Human Rights is completely universal and at odds with the principle of democratic voice
and the reflexive acts necessary to constitution making. The state, not the community, pro-
vides the norms both of admission and good citizenship, The sovereign state, independent
of rather than in response to the community, controls the identity of the nation through its
rules of membership admission (and revocation), and its rules of good conduct as a citizen,
The modern democratic state aQjudicates this tension based on cosmopolitan human rights
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principles that are context transcending and rational norms of procedure and debate. Ac-
cording to Benhabib, all modern constitutions offer membership according to a schedule of
rightsjustified in universal terms. Those universal norms demand inclusion, but the demo-
cratic polity draws restrictions in defining who constitutes the polity. In constructing the
dialectic as simply one between universal norms and particular interests of the demos, the
universal norms are placed in a trump position.
How does a democratic polity aQjudicate the dialectic between the boundaried commu-
nity of a state and the transcendent universal principles on which a democratic state must
be based according to Benhabib? Following Ji.irgen Habermas, the principles of discourse
ethics provide the answer. In the dialectic between these international "universal" norms
and the decisions of democratic legislatures, variations in "iterations" in relation to the
political and legal culture of individual polities are possible, where iterations are defined as
contentious public debates and disputes in a fluid and open process that defines the identity
of the democratic polity and the sovereign nation. Every fluid iteration is a transformation
of an authoritative original meaning in a new and different context so that the original is
"aufgehobt" in Hegel's expression (not used by Benhabib) where the original is preserved
through its continuous deployment, stored away in its current expression, and transformed
through interaction with the world at its external territorial boundaries and between and
among its internal social fault lines.
These iterations are "democratic" if there are "complex processes of public argument,
deliberation, and exchange through which universalist rights claims and principles are con-
tested and contextualized, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned, throughout legal
and political institutions, as well as in the associations of civil society" (179). Who par-
ticipates in the argumentation or "discourses"? Each and every individual has the right to
initiate a debate through a "speech act" and request ajustification of practices and presup-
positions. The participants in such debates are not simply members of the same polity, but
potentially any individual impacted by the normal norms one upholds, Thus, cosmopolitan
"rights" define the lEitimacy of the polis and who participates in the debates, while the
demos with its more selective membership interprets which variable interpretation is appli-
cable in a particular context in different political and legal cultures, Whatever variations, if
those cultures fail to live up to those cosmopolitan values that define the boundaries of a
democraiic polis, the polity has failed.
What are those transcendent universal metanorms? The end is equality-the applica-
tions must be nondiscriminatory in formulation and execution. The process of deciding on
that equality must be transparent. Those who decide are and must be responsible. Further,
the application of the principle of equality applied in a transparent way in a democratic
contextually rooted process must be measured in accordance with a norm of accountabi lity
that demands that reasons be offered and all affected parties be given a voice in the process
of making the decision to ensure moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity, Institutional
practices that offend any one of those principles must be subjected to critique.
How do we defend out particular interests and the rights of our group at the same time
as we take on the issue of the membership rights of others? Those issues of membership
are about both entry to that membership and the benefits and respect accorded through that
membership. How can we belong to bounded communities within which we debate these
issues with a cosmopolitan impact at the same time as we engage in a universal and open
moral conversation? For the very methodology raises the question of democratic citizens
of a particular state who by definition exclude others from debate, and a discourse ethics
that demands that they can be part of the debate when the debate itself mediates between
the demands of universal morality and the ethical, political, legal, and operational practices
that bind us as a members of a community. By definition, we have a cosmopolitan focus
with a particular locus.
Seyla Benhabib, the Eugene Meyer Professor of Political Science and Philosophy
at Yale University, approaches the problem of membership acceptance and rqjection first
through an examination of the third article of Kant's doctrine of cosmopolitan right deal-
ing with the right of hospitality, secondly Hannah Arendt's focus on the stateless and the
importance of everyone belonging to a polis and being a "legal" person, and then Rawls's
The Law of Peoples lf Kant supplied the universal philosophical moral principles without
being able to derive from those principles the right to membership in a state but only a
right to hospitality, Arendt supplies the right to membership in a state-but without the
articulation of universal moral principles upon which to base that right, but only the "histor-
ical arbitrariness of republican acts of founding whose arc of equality will always include
some and exclude others" (66). Only the collective will of sovereign polities will provide
guarantees and protection for rights to membership in some sovereign state. For Benhabib,
Kant, and Arendt fail because their "moral cosmopolitanism founders on their legal and
civic particularism" (66). In contrast, for Benhabib, each and every individual has rights
independent of their state membership in the recognition of their universal status as human
persons and such "cosmopolitan rights create a network of obligations and imbrications
around sovereignty" (67),
lf one is to start from a premise of popular rather than state sovereignty to articulate
a theory of membership, the road forks in two directions, On one route, the "people" are
defined in "civic" terms as simply all those who are members of a state. In the other route,
the "people" are defined in nationalist terms as a nation that may or may not constitute
or even be recognized by a state. Though Benhabib initially claims that, "Rawl's Law of
Peoples is state-centric and cannot dojustice either sociologically or normatively to ques-
tions raised by border-crossings," (72) Benhabib also states that Rawls distinguishes states
from peoples and argues that "peoples, not states, are the relevant moral and sociological
actors in reasoning aboutjustice on a global scale" (77). This apparent contradiction in
interpretation is clarified when it is understood that in developing his overall philosophical
position, Rawls moved from the individual and his/her role and rights in a liberal state in
which citizens do not have to agree on the good, but they do have to agree and to arrive at an
overlapping consensus aboutjustice and the right, to the political liberal society created by
that state, and then to the peoples by whom and for whom states are created. However, in the
historical genealogical order of development, the people come first, the state comes second,
and the conception ofthe individual as a person deserving of respect and as a possessor of
rights comes third,
For Rawls, that is why a people constitutes a state as a sovereign body serving all its
citizens, not just the members of the people, The people assign sovereignty to the state
while not abrogating the obligation of the state to preserve itself as a people. Though an
individual member of a people carries obligations from birth to death, a people lacks the
sovereign power of enforcement. State sovereignty is only developed when a people create
a state that, in turn, will create and will enforce by law and coercive force the individual's
obligations to the state and the rules of admission into that state,
Both Rawls and Benhabib as defenders of proceduraljustice share a high regard for
transparency as a metanorm, Rawls in the guise of the "veil of ignorance" that insists
that no one hides behind a device, such as the Ring of Gyges, that puts one individual
at an advantage in terms of deliberation and decision making over another. Both share a
high regard for rational public discourse, what Benhabib from the perspective of discourse
ethics calls "free public reason" and Rawls calls "practical discourse," Benhabib also places
herself on the side of a people's sovereignty rather than state sovereignty. Both respect
the fundamental thesis of multiculturalism and its aspiration to create an atmosphere of
mutual recognition between and among different cultures and systems of value that respects
differences and allows for tolerance of various interpretations of the good that often conflict
and are sometimes incommensurable. Both recognize the importance of culture to the
recognition of rights and that such rights are really only respected in liberal societies, So
where do they differ and why is Benhabib so critical of Rawls?
In general, although they both provide a neo-Kantian system of norms for mediating
conflicting interests and value discussion to legitimate political decisions, the mqjor dif-
ference is that for Rawls, the public sphere is content neutral and impartial governed by
an overlapping consensus and provides a place for interests to be debated, whereas for
Benhabib it is procedurally neutral but, like Will Kymlicka, a contentious arena to debate
values as well, for cultural membership impacts on the public sphere in many ways, though
Kymlicka, true to his Canadian roots, puts far greater emphasis not only on the importance
for liberalism in giving substantive recognition in the public sphere to those differences but
also on the crucial importance of a specific culture as a necessary condition for individual
freedom, for it is only when cultural membership is recognized as a primary good that we
can have individuals who can respect themselves and can participate in public debate with
confidence.
Suspicious of impartiality and a wall between the public and the private realms, in
Benhabib, the self embedded in social relationships has a Kantian duty to engage in public
debate when the norms of the private sphere come into conflict in the public sphere, for
associational ties project the values of each group into the public arena. Like Kymlicka,
Benhabib explicitly values cultures that offer choice and that allow individuals to opt out of
their cultures, valuing cultural transformation over cultural preservation and reproduction.
Unlike Kymlicka, she argues that the public space must be preserved as an arena where
that choice can be made and, in this respect, is closer to Rawls. Hence the importance of
preserving schools as neutral places provided the procedural norms are followed, instead
of permitting them to be used to display through performative rather than speech acts
the symbols of one's personal culture. Her final two chapters take on actual practices: the
disaggregation of citizen rights between identity and rights to social benefits in the European
Union, and then voting rights and the rights to wear head scarves in schools.
In the disputes over head scarves in France and Germany where the global confronts
the local and national, we have an opportunity for a critical examination of Benhabib's
portrait of the dialectic interaction of the principles of discourse ethics and process norms
of transparency and accountability applied to the application of the universal norm, the
equal right of every human being, regardless of political status, to have certain inalienable
rights and to be respected as a legal person, to a particular context.
ln France, l'affair du foulard began in 1989. Three Muslim girls-Fatima, Leila, and
Samira-were expelled from their school in Creil for wearing head scarves, breaching a
compromise reached by school authorities and their parents. The three girls consulted M.
Daniel Youssouf Leclerq who was once president of the National Federation of Muslims
(FNFM) in France and headed an organization called lnt€grit6. Benhabib does not state
that FNFM (as well as the Union of lslamic Organizations of France IUOIF]) was widely
considered to be radical, and that the government subsequently made efforts to set up a rival
national Muslim organization through which it could negotiate to aQjudicate such issues as
halal preparation of meats, training of Imams, appointing lmams for hospitals and prisons,
etc, The affairculminated recently when the French National Assembly voted 494 to 36 with
31 abstentions to ban the wearing of "ostentatious" (as distinct from "discreet") religious
symbols in public schools-large Christian crosses, Jewish yarmulkes, and head scarves
worn by religious Muslim women.
Benhabib interpreted the girls'gesture as using French freedoms to challenge the
French notion of larcit6 that insists on a wall between the private and the public realms in
matters of religion in the public arena; schools must remain neutral with respect to religion.
By bringing a symbol of the home into public space, the girls challenged the state. They
also confronted the Muslim definition of the place of the woman in the home; a head scarf
traditionally reinforced identification with that cultural and normative history rather than
serving a public role of democratic contestation. For Benhabib, the decision to wear a head
scarf was "a conscious political gesture" on the part of the three girls, a gesture of both
identifi cation and defiance.
In determining that any "ostentatious" religious display was banned, the principle of
equality was observed. The commission of inquiry and the debate over the laws were
transparent. According to human rights and discourse ethics norms, the principle of ac-
countability, however, was offended when the girls themselves were not evidently given
the opportunity to both speak and be heard, Benhabib argues that if they had been heard,
"it would have become clear that the meaning of wearing the scarf itself was changing
from being a religious act to one of cultural defiance and increasing politicization" (191),
Benhabib never explains why a religious act became primarily an act of political cultural
defiance, lf it did, perhaps the responsibility belonged to French culture and not to the girls.
Benhabib chastises the authorities-not for their motives, intentions, or even their decision,
but for the process of reaching their decision without allowing the girls to be interrogated
about their intentions and motives to account for their actions before the school community.
Democratic legitimation allows debate; it does not demand debate, especially in an
intolerant atmosphere, one where there is no evidence of harm, "Neutrality" may be a deep
cultural trait. But it is not necessarily connected with cosmopolitan rights when the onus is
placed on students and not the institution for observing neutrality. lt defines tolerance by
making that which is to be tolerated publicly invisible-not an obvious interpretation of a
cosmopolitan norm of transparency. Benhabib privileges accountability over transparency
and thereby redefines transparency as repressing religious expression in the public sphere.
Why interrogate the girls? To ascertain their intentions and motivesl Benhabib specu-
lates on the intentions of the girls-possibly acts of cultural defiance, adolescent acting out
to gain attention and prominence, Benhabib also speculates on their motives-fear, convic-
tion, narcissism? Other than the reference to FNFM, which she never describes as reputedly
radical, Benhabib provides no evidence for her hermeneutical explanation orjustifies her
speculations in the language of psychobabble, Nor does she ever consider that it might be
an assault on both their rights and their privacy to demand such a public accounting, and
that such a request for an accounting might not be simply a discussion of differences but a
demand for the girls to defend their actions when the issue might be that there is no reason
that their action needs to be defended. Penalizing does not only arise from criminalization
but also from subjecting people to forms of discourse to which they may object and where
the demand for an explanation may itself be in need ofjustification. lt is one thing to offer
an opportunity for individuals to discuss an issue; it is another to demand that individuals
justify their actions in an atmosphere of widespread opposition. In any case, what relevance
do intentions and motives have to assessing rights to free expression? And why are the
intentions and motives of the state-possibly, and likely, pandering to the anti-Muslim vote
and the backlash-not interrogated?
For Benhabib, this failure "reimprisons them [the three girls] within the walls of pa-
triarchal meaning," The norms of respect and equal treatment for religious beliefs require
that they "clarify how they intend to treat the beliefs of others from different religions"
(192). Where was there any suggestion that the wearing of a head scarf made any statement
about disrespect for the beliefs of others? Why should the three girls be asked to defend
something that they themselves had not put into question and when there is no evidence of
harm? In addition to demanding an interrogation of the wrong party, part of the problem is
that Benhabib privileges transparency, equality, and accountability as universal norms over
liberty and fraternity, without accounting for their privileged status, the particular interpre-
tations of each, or the tensions between those interpretations. ln other words, the dialectic is
not only about political culture but about the particular interpretations given of supposedly
cosmopolitan norms, including the proposal that expressions of cultural difference that are
perceived as politically defiant must be defended in public. Privileging of the "universal"
norm of public accountability in this particular way is simply an invisible form ofjusti-
fying state repression politely rather than ruthlessly in the name of tolerance and rational
discourse. The many omissions of context by Benhabib, such as the fact that because of
municipal debates and considerations and the resultant opposition, there arejust over fifteen
mosques-most in private homes-in a population of five million Muslims, reinforces this
critique,
Benhabib's case of the German scarf issue supports such an interpretation. In 1998,
Fereshta Ludin, an Afghan-born naturalized German who taught kindergarten was barred by
the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg from wearing a head scarf when she taught, Upon refusal
to comply, she was fired. In the effort to balance individual liberty with the principle of public
neutrality by the state, in September 2003, the German High Court ruled that individual
states were free to ban or to permit wearing of head scarves in the German school system,
but that states had to find arrangements "acceptable to everyone" while balancing religious
liberty and the neutrality requirement, Legislatures were asked to take into account and
give reasons for balancing the following principles: the freedom of religion of the teacher,
the rights of parents to determine the education of their children and the cultural identities
and traditions to which they would be exposed, the rights of children not to be exposed
to religious influences without consent, and the obligation of neutrality on the part of the
state. The issue was one of "ostentatious" display of membership in the teacher's religious
community of origin, a community of "fate and memory," and whether that prevented the
teacher from carrying out her duties as a civil servant ofthe state.
Though no sufficient basis in existing law was available to make such a decision when
the teacher was fired, the High Court did not reverse the ban but simply ruled that the
legislature had to decide such matters. Instead of dismissing the ban until the legislature
made a decision, even though there was no legal foundation for it, the ban was upheld and
the legislature given time to decide. The public had a right to weigh and the onus was placed
on the people in authority who imposed the ban to have a legal foundation for their actions
and for the legislation itself interfering with civil liberties to bejustified by reasons, Th is flts
in with the discourse ethics. But the absence of a legal foundation for action was not seen
as a reason for chastising the authorities who imposed the ban without lawful authority.
Unlike the French decision, Benhabib does not fault the German decision because it
instantiated discursive ethics and its focus on the process of making a decision, Decisions
without a legal basis were not faulted. The fact that many if not most states in Germany
would soon legislate the ban only indicated that the legislatures did not have to provide real
proof that wearing a religious head scarf would, in fact, be a bad influence on children and
would interfere with the rights of parents to determine their children's religious affiliation.
Benhabib demonstrates that discourse ethics provides an opportunity for the prql'udices
of communities to be reinforced by "rational" rules of process, In the evaluation of that
process, crucial pieces of information concerning context are omitted; in 2005, Germany
has a population of approximately 3.2 million Muslims, about 8 percent of the total, but less
than half a million are citizens. Further, popular beliefs of effects displace ostensible proof.
Legal rules of law and rules of evidence are set aside. And ostensible universal norms like
"transparency" and "accountability" are given very particular and, I would argue, warped
interpretations. Finally, the debate on these very marginal issues of prqjudice provides a
distraction from the many issues and circumstances that point to the broadening democratic
deficit.
